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Abstract
We develop a tractable method to estimate multiple prior models of decision-making under 
ambiguity. In a representative sample of the U.S. population, we measure ambiguity attitudes in 
the gain and loss domains. We find that ambiguity aversion is common for uncertain events of 
moderate to high likelihood involving gains, but ambiguity seeking prevails for low likelihoods 
and for losses. We show that choices made under ambiguity in the gain domain are best explained 
by the α-MaxMin model, with one parameter measuring ambiguity aversion (ambiguity 
preferences) and a second parameter quantifying the perceived degree of ambiguity (perceptions 
about ambiguity). The ambiguity aversion parameter α is constant and prior probability sets are 
asymmetric for low and high likelihood events. The data reject several other models, such as 
MaxMin and MaxMax, as well as symmetric probability intervals. Ambiguity aversion and the 
perceived degree of ambiguity are both higher for men and for the college-educated. Ambiguity 
aversion (but not perceived ambiguity) is also positively related to risk aversion. In the loss 
domain, we find evidence of reflection, implying that ambiguity aversion for gains tends to 
reverse into ambiguity seeking for losses. Our model’s estimates for preferences and perceptions 
about ambiguity can be used to analyze the economic and financial implications of such 
preferences.
Keywords
Ambiguity; Decision-making under uncertainty; Multiple prior models; Alpha-MaxMin model
1 Introduction
Ambiguity about probability distributions for uncertain outcomes plays a central role in 
many important decisions. A common way of modeling choice under ambiguity is to assume 
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that decision-makers consider multiple possible probability distributions, following Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1989). These multiple prior models posit that decision-makers consider the 
prior distributions yielding the worst expected utility (MaxMin model), the highest expected 
utility (MaxMax model), or some weighted average of both extremes (α-MaxMin).1 
Although multiple prior models are widely used in theoretical studies of decision-making 
under ambiguity,2 relatively little is known about how to calibrate or estimate the 
parameters of multiple prior models, particularly those which distinguish between 
preferences and perceptions. This paper proposes a simple and tractable method to estimate 
the α-MaxMin model. We then estimate the model’s parameters using choices made in a 
large representative survey of the U.S. population.
Our method allows us to estimate both preferences towards ambiguity and perceptions 
about the level of ambiguity. We model these with two parameters: α indicates a decision-
maker’s dislike of ambiguity, and δ gauges his beliefs about the degree of ambiguity relative 
to a reference probability distribution (i.e., the decision-maker’s confidence in this 
distribution). Chateauneuf et al. (2007) introduce the specification of α-MaxMin used in this 
paper and they show it is equivalent to a Choquet expected utility model with a neo-additive 
capacity, providing a solid axiomatic (i.e., behavioral) foundation.
Our first major contribution is to develop a simple method to estimate these two parameters, 
α and δ, without requiring any information about utility or risk aversion. The procedure is as 
follows: We measure ambiguity attitudes using matching probabilities, applying the 
elicitation method of Dimmock et al. (2015b). Our interactive questions follow the 
traditional Ellsberg two-urn problem, presenting respondents with simple binary choices 
between betting on the color of a ball drawn from an urn with a known composition of balls, 
versus an urn with an unknown composition. We also vary the likelihood of the ambiguous 
event from low, to medium, to high, resulting in three separate measurements. In the context 
of the α-MaxMin model, we then mathematically derive how the matching probability of an 
ambiguous event is a function of that event’s likelihood, as well as the two key model 
parameters α and δ. We show how the resulting equation can be easily estimated empirically 
with an ordinary least squares regression, providing estimators for α and δ. Further, we 
derive how alternative assumptions about the prior distribution set translate into different, 
empirically testable, constraints on the regression coefficients.
Our second major contribution is to estimate these two key parameters for ambiguity 
preferences (α) and perceptions (δ) using a large representative survey of the U.S. 
population, so they can be used to calibrate the α-MaxMin model in other studies. For this 
purpose we fielded a custom-designed module in the American Life Panel (ALP), 
implementing the ambiguity questions with real incentives for all participants. On average 
respondents are only slightly ambiguity averse, while there is strong heterogeneity in 
ambiguity attitudes in the population: 52% of the respondents are ambiguity-averse, 38% 
ambiguity-seeking, and only 10% are ambiguity-neutral. An important conclusion is that 
1See Ghirardato et al. (2004) for a behavioral foundation of the α-MaxMin model. In this paper we use the specification of the α-
MaxMin model by Chateauneuf et al. (2007).
2For instance, regarding consumption and investment see Dow and Werlang (1992) and Epstein and Wang (1994). On healthcare 
investment see Asano and Shibata (2011).
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ambiguity aversion is not universal, suggesting that a fruitful avenue for future research 
would be to relax this common assumption made in many of the ambiguity models used in 
economics and finance.
In addition to the traditional Ellsberg problem with balls of two different colors, our survey 
module also included questions asking the subject to choose between betting on urns 
containing 10 different ball colors. With these questions, we measure subjects’ attitudes 
towards ambiguous events of low likelihood (winning if one of 10 colors is drawn) and high 
likelihood (winning if any of nine of 10 colors is drawn). For uncertain events with high 
likelihood, we find that most respondents make ambiguity-averse choices (58% of the ALP 
sample), but for uncertain events with low likelihoods ambiguity-seeking choices prevail 
(60%). These results are consistent with prior studies, mostly conducted in the laboratory 
with students, summarized in Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015).
These observed choices can be explained with the α-MaxMin model with a constant 
ambiguity aversion parameter α and asymmetric prior probability sets for low and high 
likelihood events. At first glance, the same person making ambiguity-averse choices for high 
likelihood events but ambiguity-seeking choices for low likelihoods seems inconsistent with 
the α-MaxMin model, in which the decision-maker’s degree of ambiguity aversion is 
constant. Nevertheless, we show that the α-MaxMin model can explain this pattern of 
choices while keeping the ambiguity aversion parameter α constant across likelihoods, by 
modelling beliefs about the level of ambiguity with the prior distribution set of Chateauneuf 
et al. (2007). The key aspect of the model is that the prior probability set is asymmetric for 
events of low and high likelihood. For example, when winning if one out of 10 colors is 
drawn, the set of prior probabilities in the calibrated model ranges from six to 46%. 
Independent estimates of prior distributions in Andersen et al. (2012) confirm such skewness 
in beliefs for low likelihood events. Further, our data clearly reject several other variants of 
the models, such as MaxMin and MaxMax, as well as alternative specifications of the prior 
distribution set, such as symmetric probability intervals. Again, suggesting future 
applications of ambiguity models in economics and finance should use the more general α-
MaxMin model instead of the more commonly used MaxMin model.
Specifically, in a model with one representative decision-maker, we estimate an ambiguity 
aversion parameter α of 0.56, combined with 60% confidence in the reference probability 
(δ=0.40). Taken together, these estimates imply that, on average, the U.S. population is 
slightly ambiguity averse, but with ambiguity-seeking choices prevailing for low 
likelihoods, and strong ambiguity-averse behavior for high likelihoods.
Our ALP module also included ambiguity questions involving hypothetical losses to test 
whether ambiguity attitudes towards gains and losses are different, that is, to test for 
reference dependence.3 We find evidence of reflection: that is, ambiguity aversion for gains 
3We chose to implement our ambiguity question involving losses without real incentives to avoid house money effects (Thaler and 
Johnson 1990). The house money effect refers to empirical evidence that people’s risk taking can depend on prior gains and losses. In 
our setting, if we had given the respondent an initial endowment to implement real losses, the presence of an endowment could 
influence people’s subsequent decisions (e.g., more risk taking after a windfall). Exposing respondents to real losses without giving an 
initial endowment raises ethical issues.
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reverses into ambiguity seeking for losses. This resembles the reflection effect for decisions 
under risk documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1992): most people are risk averse for 
payoffs involving gains, but risk seeking for losses. To capture such reference dependence, 
we adjust the α-MaxMin model by introducing separate ambiguity aversion parameters for 
gains and losses. Our results are consistent with laboratory evidence, such as Baillon and 
Bleichrodt (2015) who find that ambiguity aversion for losses and gains differ, and Kothiyal 
et al. (2014) who provide support for reflection.
We then test how ambiguity preferences and perceptions relate to individual characteristics, 
and find that ambiguity aversion is higher among men and college-educated individuals. 
Ambiguity aversion is positively related to risk aversion, but the correlation is low and it 
does not subsume ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, ambiguity aversion is lower for older 
individuals, which may reflect learning from life experiences. The level of perceived 
ambiguity is higher among men, whites, and college-educated individuals. Overall, these 
results demonstrate that ambiguity aversion is not merely the result of poor cognitive skills, 
since college-educated respondents perceive more ambiguity and are more averse to it. 
Another relevant finding is that risk aversion is positively correlated with ambiguity 
aversion, both for gains and for losses, but risk aversion is not related to the level of 
perceived ambiguity.
Our paper is related to prior studies that empirically examine ambiguity models. Potamites 
and Zhang (2012) and Ahn et al. (2014) estimate α-MaxMin models, but they consider only 
preferences towards ambiguity and not perceptions about levels of ambiguity. Further, 
unlike our method, the specifications employed in those papers required those authors to 
specify a utility function and to simultaneously estimate risk aversion. Andersen et al. 
(2012) parametrically estimate the shape of the prior distribution, but they do not estimate 
ambiguity aversion. Only a few empirical papers have considered both preferences and 
beliefs in models of ambiguity. Andersen et al. (2009) examine both ambiguity preferences 
and prior beliefs for the smooth model of Klibanoff et al. (2005).4 Hey et al. (2010) compare 
the predictive ability of several ambiguity models, including multiple prior models, but 
without providing details about the parameter estimates of any single model.5, 6 Baillon et 
al. (2015) estimate α and δ for the α-MaxMin model specification of Chateauneuf et al. 
(2007) in a sample of 64 students. Unlike our method, their approach involves joint 
estimation of a utility function with a complex non-linear likelihood maximization. Finally, 
Dimmock et al. (2015a) analyze the same dataset as we do, but they focus on the relation 
between ambiguity aversion and portfolio choice.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the elicitation method for 
ambiguity attitudes based on matching probabilities, fielded in the American Life Panel. We 
4A related paper by Attanasi et al. (2014) tests the behavioral predictions of the smooth model using several decision tasks with 
varying levels of ambiguity (perceived ambiguity).
5The sophisticated approach of Hey et al. (2010) involves joint estimation of risk and ambiguity preferences, as well as beliefs; 
implementation used 135 choice problems per subject (students). As our objective is to measure ambiguity preferences and 
perceptions in a survey of the general population, we use a relatively simple elicitation method involving only 17 choices per subject 
that does not require joint estimation of risk preferences.
6Similarly, Conte and Hey (2013) evaluate the predictive ability of several multiple prior models based on subjects’ choices between 
two compound lotteries with known probabilities (i.e., two-stage lotteries).
Dimmock et al. Page 4
J Risk Uncertain. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 December 01.
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
also summarize the ambiguity attitudes of the U.S. population, using nonparametric statistics 
that do not assume any ambiguity model. In Section 3 we model ambiguity attitudes with the 
α-MaxMin specification of Chateauneuf et al. (2007). We then derive an equation for the 
matching probability as a function of the two key model parameters α and δ, and the 
likelihood of the ambiguous event. In Section 4 we first show how this equation can be 
estimated with panel regressions, and then we estimate α and δ for the U.S. population, 
using our ALP data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring ambiguity attitudes
The survey module we use to measure ambiguity attitudes in the general population was 
fielded in the American Life Panel (ALP), a representative panel of U.S. households that 
regularly answer Internet surveys.7 The module offered respondents real rewards based on 
their choices. Specifically, at the outset of the survey module, all subjects were told that one 
of their choices in the ambiguity questions involving gains would be randomly selected and 
played for a chance to win $15. In total, real incentives worth $23,850 were paid to 1590 of 
the 3258 ALP subjects.8
2.1 The elicitation procedure
The ALP module posed questions similar to those in a standard Ellsberg experiment with 
two urns9 asking respondents to choose between an ambiguous Box U (Unknown) and an 
unambiguous Box K (Known), following the elicitation method of Dimmock et al. (2015b). 
Both boxes contained 100 balls, which could be purple or orange, as shown in Fig. 1. The 
respondent was told that one ball would be randomly drawn from the box he selected and he 
would win $15 if that ball was purple. For Box K, the respondent could see its content on 
the screen: 50 purple balls and 50 orange balls. The content of Box U is not shown, creating 
ambiguity. A preference for Box K over Box U indicates ambiguity aversion.
Apart from choosing Box K and Box U, respondents could also choose “Indifferent”. A 
choice of Indifferent implies ambiguity neutrality, with the subject treating Box U as if the 
probability of winning were 50% as in Box K. In cases where the subject did not select 
Indifferent in the first round, he was presented additional question rounds similar to the one 
in Fig. 1. For example, if the respondent selected Box K in Fig. 1, the known probability of 
winning was then reduced to 25% in the second round; if he chose Box U, the known 
probability of winning was increased to 75%. This process was repeated for up to four 
rounds, to closely approximate the respondent’s indifference point. The known probability 
that makes the respondent indifferent when comparing Box K and Box U is defined as the 
matching probability.10
7For more information about how the ALP recruits respondents see the American Life Panel website at https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/. 
One advantage of the ALP is that respondents who lack Internet access are provided with either a laptop and Internet access, or a so-
called WebTV that allows them to use their television to participate in the panel.
8Dimmock et al. (2015a) describe the fielding of the ALP module in more detail.
9The survey module uses “box” instead of “urn,” as the word “urn” might be unfamiliar to some.
10This approach is similar to that of Kahn and Sarin (1988), Baillon et al. (2012), Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015), and Dimmock et al. 
(2015b).
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Let m50 denote the matching probability for Question 1. We can then measure ambiguity 
aversion as follows: AA50=50%−m50. Positive values of AA50 imply ambiguity aversion, 
negative values indicate ambiguity-seeking behavior, and a value of zero shows ambiguity 
neutrality. For example, consider a respondent whose matching probability is 30% 
(m50=0.3), implying he is indifferent between Box K and Box U when Box K offers a 
known probability of winning of exactly 30%. He only prefers the ambiguous Box U when 
Box K offers a probability of winning less than 30%. This behavior is consistent with 
ambiguity aversion.
We note that, in theory, a preference for Box K over Box U in the first question round 
shown in Fig. 1 can be reconciled with subjective expected utility if a subject assigned a low 
subjective probability to drawing a purple ball from Box U (e.g., perhaps due to distrust of 
the surveyor). Nevertheless, the Ellsberg (1961) paradox then arises, because people are also 
indifferent between betting on drawing an orange ball from Box U versus betting on 
drawing a purple ball from Box U, which implies the subjective probabilities sum to less 
than 100%. Both lab experiments and field studies confirm that people are indeed indifferent 
about the winning color for Box U.11
To keep the questions as simple as possible for a survey of the general population, we did 
not include an option to change the winning color. The ALP survey is administered by the 
RAND Corporation, which our respondents trust to provide the payoffs as they have 
participated in other previous surveys with this organization. To test the assumption of no 
color preferences, we fielded an additional survey in which 250 respondents had the option 
to select their winning color, and a control group of 250 respondents did not. We find no 
significant differences in ambiguity attitudes between the two groups.12
The elicitation method presents subjects with a series of binary choices converging to the 
matching probability, instead of directly asking for the matching probabilities, as prior 
studies have shown that this produces more reliable measures of preferences (see, e.g., 
Bostic et al. 1990). Because eliciting ambiguity preferences is known to be sensitive to 
measurement error and within-person inconsistencies (see, e.g., Binmore et al. 2012; Stahl 
2014), the module included two consistency check questions. These check questions are 
similar to Fig. 1, but with the known probabilities of winning for Box K changed to 
m50+10% and m50−10%, respectively, where m50 is the subject’s matching probability. A 
preference for Box U in the first check question is inconsistent with earlier choices, as is a 
preference for Box K in the second check question.
2.2 Eliciting ambiguity attitudes for low and high likelihood events
Although exact probabilities for ambiguous events are unknown, it is often still possible to 
assess whether an event is unlikely (e.g., the U.S. inflation rate exceeding 10% next year) or 
11See, for example, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock et al. (2015b). The latter study finds that fewer than two percent of 
respondents changed the winning color.
12In August 2013, we fielded an additional survey (N=500) identical to the original except one: it offered some respondents a choice 
for the winning ball color. Specifically, a randomly selected half of the sample was allowed to select the winning color (purple or 
orange), while the other half could not. Fewer than one percent of the respondents in the group allowed to change the color did so, and 
the mean matching probabilities of the ‘color choice’ and ‘no color choice’ subgroups were not significantly different. Results are 
available upon request.
Dimmock et al. Page 6
J Risk Uncertain. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 December 01.
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
highly likely (e.g., the U.S. having positive GDP growth next year). Prior studies reveal that 
most people are ambiguity seeking for low likelihood ambiguous events, while ambiguity 
aversion is common for high likelihood events. Such preferences can be interpreted as a 
tendency to regard all ambiguous events as if they are 50–50%, or showing too little 
sensitivity to the likelihood of events (Abdellaoui et al. 2011). This effect is called 
ambiguity-generated likelihood insensitivity, or a-insensitivity.
To measure a-insensitivity the survey module included two additional sets of questions with 
boxes containing balls of 10 different colors. For instance, Fig. 2 shows the second 
ambiguity question, where the respondent won $15 if a purple ball was drawn. Here Box K 
offers a known probability of winning of 10%, while for Box U the probability is unknown. 
The third question is similar, but with the outcomes reversed: now, the subject won $15 if 
any of the nine colors other than purple was drawn, and thus for Box K the initial 
probability of winning is 90%. We define m10 and m90 as the matching probabilities for 
these two questions, which are calculated after a maximum of four rounds of bi-section.
The ambiguity aversion measures for these two questions are defined as: AA10=10% −m10, 
and AA90=90% −m90. Subjects who selected Indifferent in the first round are ambiguity 
neutral, with AA10=0 and AA90=0. A-insensitivity predicts that subjects are ambiguity 
seeking for low likelihood ambiguous events (AA10<0), and ambiguity averse for high 
likelihood events (AA90>0). Hence, we describe a respondent as a-insensitive if 
AA90−AA10>0, a-neutral if AA90−AA10=0, and a-oversensitive if AA90−AA10<0.
2.3 Eliciting ambiguity attitudes for losses
The last module question assesses ambiguity aversion when the outcomes involve losses. 
Once again, subjects had a choice between Box K with 50 purple and 50 orange balls, and 
Box U with purple and orange balls in unknown proportions. The subject would now, 
hypothetically, lose $15 if a purple ball were drawn from the chosen box. For losses, we use 
m−50 to denote the matching probability, and the ambiguity aversion measure is: 
AA−50=m−50−50%. Subjects are ambiguity averse in the loss domain if AA−50>0, implying 
they are prepared to accept a relatively high known probability of losses to avoid Box U.
When choices in the loss domain are incentivized, the standard approach is to give all 
respondents an initial endowment (e.g., $15) and then subtract subsequent losses. A 
drawback of this approach is that it can introduce a house money effect. Additionally, 
rational respondents who evaluate outcomes in terms of terminal wealth will not experience 
any losses but only gains and zero outcomes. For these reasons, we do not implement real 
losses in our module. Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) have extensively tested the 
effect of real incentives in controlled experiments for both gains and losses, and they found 
that real and hypothetical choices differ significantly only in the gain domain, but not in the 
loss domain.13
13Similarly, Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015) find no significant differences between ambiguity attitudes in the loss domain measured 
with real incentives and with hypothetical losses.
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2.4 Summary of ambiguity attitudes in the U.S. population
Table 1 summarizes ambiguity attitudes for our representative sample of the U.S. 
population. Panel A reports the proportions of people whose responses indicate ambiguity 
aversion, seeking, or neutrality. For events of moderate and high likelihood involving gains, 
most people’s choices were consistent with ambiguity aversion. For example, for the first 
ambiguity question with two ball colors over half of the respondents (52%) make ambiguity-
averse choices, only 10% were ambiguity neutral, and 38% were ambiguity seeking. Hence, 
ambiguity attitudes are heterogeneous, and ambiguity aversion is far from universal. This 
finding is consistent with other field data studies,14 and experimental studies summarized in 
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015).
For the high likelihood event (winning if any of nine of the 10 colors is selected), 58% of 
our respondents were ambiguity averse and only 30% sought ambiguity. By contrast, for the 
low likelihood event (winning if one of the 10 colors is selected), 60% of respondents were 
ambiguity seeking and only 19% were ambiguity averse. This provides strong evidence of a-
insensitivity, the tendency to treat all ambiguous events as equally probable. Indeed, Panel B 
of Table 1 shows that 81% of the respondents were a-insensitive (AA90>AA10).
Panel C provides summary statistics for the matching probabilities and the ambiguity 
aversion measures. For example, the median respondent was indifferent between a known 
probability of 47% winning for Box K versus betting on one of two colors in Box U, 
indicating a low degree of ambiguity aversion (median AA50=0.50–0.47=0.03). For the high 
likelihood event, the median attitude indicates relatively strong ambiguity aversion (median 
AA90=0.13), while for the low likelihood event the median implies ambiguity-seeking 
behavior (median AA10=−0.075).
Turning to the loss domain, Panel A reveals that ambiguity seeking is the most common 
response (40%), followed by aversion (33%), and neutrality (27%). The average degree of 
ambiguity aversion for losses is close to zero, due to the strong heterogeneity in attitudes. To 
examine reference dependence, we test the null hypothesis that mean AA50=meanAA−50. A 
paired samples t-test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of ‘no reference dependence’ (p-
value<0.01); accordingly, ambiguity aversion differs for gains and for losses in the general 
population, consistent with the experimental results of Cohen et al. (1987), Abdellaoui et al. 
(2005), and Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015). We next test for reflection, or mean AA50=
−meanAA−50, which implies that ambiguity aversion for gains is reflected into ambiguity-
seeking behavior for losses. In this case the null hypothesis ‘reflection’ cannot be rejected 
(p-value=0.411).15 Using experimental data, Vieider et al. (2012) and Kothiyal et al. (2014) 
also found reflection at the aggregate and individual level for decisions under ambiguity.
14Butler et al. (2014) report that 52% of 1686 Italian bank customers are ambiguity averse (without real incentives), while in Akay et 
al. (2012) 57% of 92 Ethiopian farmers are ambiguity averse. In a sample of 666 subjects from the Dutch population, Dimmock et al. 
(2015b) find that 68% were ambiguity averse, 10% neutral, and 22% seeking, suggesting that ambiguity aversion is more common 
among the Dutch.
15A signed rank test for the median gives similar results: p-value<0.01 for no reference dependence (median AA50= median AA−50); 
p-value=0.13 for reflection (median AA50=− median AA−50).
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Finally, Panel D of Table 1 reports positive and significant correlations between all four 
question-specific measures of ambiguity attitudes. Hence, although ambiguity aversion does 
differ across likelihoods and for gains versus losses, the estimates are all positively related. 
This is consistent with a common underlying factor driving ambiguity aversion across 
domains.
In results not reported in detail here (see Online Appendix A), we also examine respondent 
consistency with the two check questions mentioned above. We find that 41% of the 
respondents answer both check questions correctly, while 17% give both consistent and 
indifferent answers. The remaining 42% of our respondents contradict an earlier choice once 
(39%) or twice (3%). The consistency rates are low, but similar to earlier findings in the 
Netherlands (Dimmock et al. 2015b) and in experimental settings (e.g., Trautmann and van 
de Kuilen 2015). As an important robustness check, all estimates in Section 4 are repeated in 
the full sample as well as the subset of respondents who passed both consistency checks (see 
Section 4.3).
3 Multiple prior models for decision-making under ambiguity
We next specify a tractable version of the α-MaxMin model, which can be estimated using 
the matching probabilities observed in the survey data. The model has two parameters: α, 
which measures ambiguity aversion; and δ, which measures the degree of perceived 
ambiguity relative to a reference distribution in which the decision-maker has limited 
confidence.
3.1 The α-MaxMin model
We model uncertainty using a state space S consisting of a finite number of future states of 
the world (s1,s2,…,sn). One state s ∈ S is true and the other states are not, but which state is 
true is uncertain. Subsets of the state space are called events. For example, event 
E={s1,s3,s6} is true if the state is s1, s3, or s6. The set containing all possible events is 
denoted by Θ. A probability measure P is a function P:Θ→ℝ that assigns real numbers 
between 0 and 1 to events, with the following properties: P(Ø)=0,P(S)=1, P(E)≤P(F) for all 
events E,F∈Θ with E⊆F, and P(E∪F)=P(E)+P(F)−P(E∩F). Let Γ denotes the set of all 
possible probability measures. A prospect x is a function assigning outcomes to events, 
x:Θ→ℝ, giving monetary amount x(E) if event E occurs. For example, in our experiment 
with ambiguous Box U, there are two states, s1=a purple ball is drawn, and s2=an orange 
ball is drawn, with respective outcomes x(s1)=$15 and x(s2)=$0. Finally, we assume that the 
decision-maker has an increasing utility function U:ℝ→ℝ over outcomes.
Ambiguity occurs when the decision-maker does not know the exact probabilities of all 
events E in Θ. Multiple prior models assume that the decision-maker considers a convex set 
C of possible probability measures P ∈ C. In the multiple prior model of Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989), the decision-maker uses the worst distribution in C to evaluate 
prospects, as follows:
(1)
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where EP[U(x)] denotes the expected utility of prospect x under probability measure P, and x 
is shorthand notation for x(s).
When choosing between prospects x and y, the decision-maker strictly prefers x over y if and 
only if minP∈CEP[U(x)]>minP∈CEP[U(y)]. Hence, the decision-maker acts as if he 
maximizes the minimum expected utility value, giving rise to the name MaxMin. The 
MaxMin model implies that the decision-maker is ambiguity averse or pessimistic, as he 
evaluates prospects based on the prior probability distribution giving the lowest expected 
utility.
Ambiguity-seeking behavior is consistent with Equation (1) if we replace the minimum over 
P by the maximum, which is called the MaxMax model. The α-MaxMin model combines 
these two extremes, with weight α ∈ [0,1]:
(2)
Thus the α-MaxMin model can accommodate both ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking 
behavior.16 Furthermore, the set of prior distributions C now reflects perceived ambiguity, 
while α is a measure of aversion to this ambiguity. Maximum ambiguity aversion occurs at 
the value α=1 (MaxMin), and maximum ambiguity seeking at α=0 (MaxMax).
3.2 The multiple prior set
A complication in empirically implementing the α-MaxMin model is the specification and 
estimation of the set of priors C. In a real-world setting such as investing, it can be difficult 
for decision-makers to indicate exactly which prior probability distributions they consider 
plausible. Previous literature on ambiguity often adopts a specification for C termed ε-
contamination (e.g., Epstein and Wang 1994). The approach assumes that the decision-
maker has a reference probability distribution, π, which is an assessment of the probability 
of events based on his subjective beliefs. The decision-maker is aware, however, that he 
does not know the true probabilities, so he considers all distributions in the larger set 
Cε={Q∈Γ:Q=(1−ε)π+εP, for P∈D}, with ε ∈ [0,1] and D is a given set of contaminating 
probability measures. Hence π is contaminated with distributions from the set D, with the 
parameter ε determining the perceived level of ambiguity. In empirical applications, though, 
researchers still must specify or estimate the set of contaminating probability distributions 
D.
In our specification of perceived ambiguity, we adhere to the concept of a reference 
distribution π. Following Chateauneuf et al. (2007), we assume the decision-maker has a 
degree of confidence (1−δ) in π, with δ ∈ [0,1]. He then considers the set Cδ of probability 
measures P assigning at least probability (1-δ)π(E) to all events E:
(3)
16Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Eichberger et al. (2011) provide a behavioral (i.e., axiomatic) foundation for the α-MaxMin model.
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At first glance, Cδ appears to provide only lower bounds on probabilities. But we note that 
inequality (3) also holds for each event E’s complement, defined as Ec=S\E.17 Thus P(Ec)≥
(1−δ)π(Ec). Using P(Ec)=1−P(E), we get 1−P(E)≥(1−δ)(1−π(E)), which gives the following 
upper bound: P(E)≤1−(1−δ)(1−π(E))=(1−δ)π(E)+δ. Accordingly, the set of priors Cδ 
imposes the following bounds on the probability measures P∈Cδ:
(4)
The prior set Cδ allows the probability P(E) to vary in an interval of length δ around the 
reference probability π(E).18 We note that the reference probability π(E) does not 
necessarily lie in the middle of the interval: this is only case for π(E)=0.5 or δ=0. For 
π(E)<0.5, the interval will be longer above π(E) than below π(E), and vice versa when 
π(E)>0.5. This feature is important for explaining ambiguity-seeking behavior for low 
likelihood events but ambiguity aversion elsewhere, as we will explain later.
The prior set Cδ for α-MaxMin, originally introduced by Chateauneuf et al. (2007), is useful 
in empirical applications for several reasons. First, the perceived level of ambiguity is 
captured by δ and the standard subjective expected utility framework is a special case when 
δ=0. Second, instead of eliciting the decision-maker’s entire set of possible priors C (or the 
set D), we simply specify one reference distribution π and estimate the confidence level (1-
δ). In applications with Ellsberg urns, the values for π follow naturally from symmetry 
conditions. In stock market applications, a good candidate for π would be the estimated 
return distribution based on historical data.19 Third, Chateauneuf et al. (2007, Remark 3.2) 
show that the α-MaxMin model with prior set Cδ is equivalent to their Choquet expected 
utility model with a neo-additive capacity, and they provide an axiomatic foundation for the 
latter.20 In this way, the preference ordering implied by the model satisfies important 
properties such as completeness, reflexivity, and transitivity.
3.3 The α-MaxMin model with prior set Cδ applied to our experiment
For our first survey question, Box U contained 100 balls, each having one of two possible 
colors, purple or orange, with the proportions unknown. One ball was drawn randomly from 
Box U and the respondent won $15 if the ball was purple, and nothing otherwise. For 
S={s1,s2}, state s1 denotes a purple ball was drawn, and similarly s2 denotes an orange ball 
was drawn. The outcomes are x(s1)=$15 and x(s2)=0, evaluated with utility function U. The 
utility function can be rescaled such that U(0)=0 and U(15)>0. The α-MaxMin model with 
prior distribution set Cδ then evaluates the prospect x as follows:
17Ec contains all states s except those contained in event E: E∪ Ec = S and E ∩ Ec=∅.
18Note that P(E)=0 for E∈N, where N denotes a set of all null events E∈N with π(E)=0.
19Given sufficient experimental time one could elicit a subjective measure π for uncertain events from revealed preferences at the 
individual level as in Abdellaoui et al. (2011).
20The measures of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity introduced by Abdellaoui et al. (2011), named Index b and Index a, also 
derive from a neo-additive capacity and can therefore be linked to α and δ. That is, for their a-insensitivity measure: Index a=δ. For 
their ambiguity aversion measure: Index b=(2α−1)δ. Hence, Index b is positive if and only if α > 0.5 and δ > 0.
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(5)
where π=π(s1) is the reference probability of drawing a purple ball from Box U.
Box K offers a known probability p of winning the $15 prize and it is evaluated with 
expected utility (δ=0), giving: E[U(x)]=pU(15). The matching probability m is the known 
probability p that makes the respondent indifferent when comparing Box K and Box U. 
Respondents are indifferent between the two when ((1−δ)π+(1−α)δ)U(15)=pU(15), so the 
matching probability m is:
(6)
We note that the utility function cancels out in the comparison, so we need not estimate 
utility (or risk aversion) in order to measure people’s ambiguity attitudes: this is a major 
advantage of the elicitation method.
Similar to what is shown in Section 3.1, once we know the matching probability, we can 
define an index of ambiguity aversion as: AA=π−m=(α−(1−π))δ. It follows that in the special 
case of no perceived ambiguity, δ=0, the matching probability is π and respondents are 
ambiguity neutral (AA=0). For respondents who perceive some ambiguity about the exact 
probability of winning for Box U, δ>0, the ambiguity attitudes are:
(7)
We take π=0.5 as the relevant reference probability for drawing a purple ball from Box U, 
assuming indifference between having purple or orange as the winning color. The result 
above implies decision-makers perceiving some degree of ambiguity about the number of 
purple balls in Box U (δ>0) will be ambiguity averse in our first ambiguity question (AA>0) 
if α>0.5, ambiguity seeking (AA<0) if α<0.5, and ambiguity neutral (AA=0) if α=0.5.
We repeat this analysis for our second ambiguity question where Box U contained 100 balls 
with 10 different colors, and the prize of $15 was won if one particular color was drawn. It 
is easy to show that Equations (5), (6), and (7) still hold. The only difference is that the 
reference probability for winning for one out of 10 possible colors is π=1/10. Equation (7) 
now predicts ambiguity-averse responses in the first round of the second question if α>0.9 
and δ>0. Hence, only individuals with very high levels of ambiguity aversion would still 
prefer Box K, and ambiguity-seeking choices are expected to prevail.
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The explanation for this effect is that at π=1/10, the interval of prior probabilities used by 
the decision-maker is asymmetric around π: [(1-δ)0.1, (1-δ)0.1+δ]. For example, with a 
confidence level of 80% (δ=0.2), the interval is [0.08, 0.28]. The upper bound of the interval 
is much further above π than the lower bound is below it. The result is that the ‘max’ in α-
MaxMin will influence the result more than the ‘min’, and the α-MaxMin value of Box U 
will exceed πU(15). The decision-maker will prefer Box U and display ambiguity seeking 
behavior, unless his ambiguity aversion α is sufficiently high (precisely, only if α>0.9).
The intuition for the asymmetric prior around π=1/10 follows from the fact that the prospect 
offers positive skewness: on the positive side the number of winning balls in Box U can 
range from 10 to 100, while on the negative side it can only range from zero to 10. 
Accordingly, the interval of prior probabilities reflects that perceived ambiguity should be 
higher on the upside (p>0.1) than on the downside (p<0.1). Andersen et al. (2012, Fig. 6) 
explicitly estimated the distribution of prior probabilities for an ambiguous event with 
π=1/10 in a sample of students and found that it was indeed highly positively skewed.
Similarly, Equations (5), (6), and (7) also apply to the third ambiguity question, where the 
respondent wins if any of the nine of the 10 ball colors is chosen, with reference probability 
π=9/10. We can deduce that ambiguity-averse responses will occur in the third ambiguity 
question if α>0.1 and δ>0. The interval of prior probabilities is again asymmetric. For 
example, with a confidence level of 80% (δ=0.2), the interval is [0.72, 0.92]. In this case, it 
is natural for the decision-maker to perceive more ambiguity on the downside than on the 
upside, as the number of winning balls in U could be far less than the reference number of 
90 balls. Experimental results in Andersen et al. (2012, Fig. 6) support this: the estimated 
prior distribution for an ambiguous event with π=8/10 is strongly negatively skewed.
The fourth question involved a hypothetical loss of $15 and two colors of balls. Here the 
matching probability is mL=(1-δ)π+αδ, as detailed in Online Appendix B. For losses, a 
subject was ambiguity averse if he was willing to accept a relatively high known probability 
of loss to avoid Box U, that is mL>π, corresponding to α>0.5 (see Online Appendix B).
3.4 Alternative multiple prior sets for the α-MaxMin model
We now derive the matching probability for two alternative prior sets, which we will also 
estimate and evaluate against our proposed model. First, in the special case of zero 
confidence (δ=1), the prior interval is [0, 1], and the decision-maker then considers all 
possible probabilities. The matching probability in this case is: m=(1-α). We note that m is 
independent of π, implying that the matching probability is the same for all ambiguity 
questions.
Second, we introduce an alternative prior probability set Csym, which is symmetric around 
the reference probability π:
(8)
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where p is a prior probability of winning, and d is the length of the prior probability interval. 
Using this prior interval, a prospect paying $15 if a purple ball is drawn from Box U is 
evaluated as:
(9)
Accordingly, the matching probability is m=π+(0.5–α)d, and AA=π-m=(α-0.5)d. The 
decision-maker is ambiguity neutral (AA=0) if d=0 or α=1/2, ambiguity averse (AA>0) if 
α>1/2 and d>0, and ambiguity seeking (AA<0) if α<1/2 and d>0. We note that the ambiguity 
attitude (AA) is independent of the reference probability, and thus this model cannot explain 
a-insensitivity. Further, the model implies that in a regression of m on π the slope coefficient 
of π is equal to 1, a condition that we can test empirically.
4 Estimating the α-MaxMin model
4.1 Econometric model
For our econometric model, we adopt the following notation: for each respondent (i=1,2,
…,I) and for each of the three ambiguity elicitation questions in the gains domain (k=1, 2, 
3), we measure a matching probability mik.21 Further, let πik denote the reference probability 
of winning for Box U in question k. We assume that all respondents are neutral about the 
winning color, so that subscript i can be dropped and πk has the following fixed values: 
π1=0.5, π2=0.1 and π3=0.9. To capture the general tendency of ambiguity attitudes in the 
population, in our model we initially assume that there is only one representative decision-
maker, as is common in the literature on estimating preference models. Hence, the 
parameters for ambiguity aversion α and the perceived level of ambiguity δ are constant, not 
depending on i. Equation (6) then implies that the matching probability mik in the α-
MaxMin model is equal to: mik=(1−α)δ+(1−δ)πk, for k=1, 2, 3. Empirically, we estimate this 
equation as follows:
(10)
where c and s are coefficients, and εik is an identically and independently distributed error 
term.
Model (10) can be estimated with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), with k observations 
for each respondent. The parameters of the α-MaxMin model are identified as δ=1−s and 
α=1−c/δ. Standard errors for δ and α are computed with the delta method. We can now test 
and compare the fit of different versions of the α-MaxMin model using the following 
restrictions:
(11a)
21For now, we defer discussion of the ambiguity loss question (k=4) to Section 4.4.
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(11b)
(11c)
(11d)
(11e)
(11f)
(11g)
(11h)
Here Csym is a symmetric prior probability interval (of unknown length d), while [0,1] 
denotes the prior interval where the decision-maker considers all possible probabilities, and 
Cδ the asymmetric prior probability set where the decision-maker has confidence (1−δ) in 
the reference probability π. Tests of restrictions (11a–h) allow us to see which specification 
of α-MaxMin best describes the general pattern of ambiguity attitudes in the U.S. 
population.
To loosen the restrictive assumption of one representative decision-maker and to take into 
account heterogeneity in ambiguity preferences (see, e.g., Stahl 2014), we include a random 
effect in the model: mik=c+sπk+εik+ui, where ui is a random effect that is independent of the 
error term (εik) and uncorrelated between individuals, with . The random effect 
captures unobserved heterogeneity in the ambiguity aversion parameter αi across individuals 
i, with αi=1−(c+ui)/δ. Finally, we use clustered standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity between individuals, and correlation of the error terms within.
4.2 Main results
Table 2 displays our estimates of the constant c and the slope coefficient s. Additionally, the 
table shows estimates for the α-MaxMin model parameters α, (1−α), and δ, to facilitate 
interpretation and testing of hypotheses. Column (1) reports estimates for our baseline 
sample consisting of 2991 respondents who answered all ambiguity questions and who spent 
at least two minutes answering the ambiguity questions.22 The dependent variables are the 
matching probabilities, mik for the first three ambiguity questions (k=1, 2, 3), involving only 
gains and implemented with real incentives. We discuss the results for losses in a later 
22Out of the 3258 original respondents, 3 did not answer any questions, 85 did not complete all of our ambiguity questions, and 179 
spent less than two minutes on answering the ambiguity questions. After excluding these 267 respondents, we have a final sample of 
2991 respondents.
Dimmock et al. Page 15
J Risk Uncertain. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 December 01.
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
A
uthor M
anuscript
section. The estimates shown in Table 2 are for a random effects model specification; 
estimates for the model without random effects in (10) are similar and therefore not 
reported.23
Our baseline results show that, overall, the U.S. population is ambiguity averse. Column (1) 
of Table 2 reports α=0.56, combined with 60% confidence in the reference probability 
(δ=0.40).24 The extent of ambiguity aversion is modest, with only a slight overweighting of 
the worst outcome (α>1/2). Nevertheless, it is statistically significant as we can reject α≤1/2 
(t=8.47 and p-value<0.01). Together, these estimates (α=0.56, δ=0.40) imply ambiguity-
seeking behavior for the low likelihood ambiguous event of winning if one of 10 possible 
colors is chosen. Here, our model predicts a matching probability of 0.24. The estimates also 
imply relatively strong ambiguity-averse behavior for the high likelihood ambiguous event 
of winning if any of nine of 10 possible colors is selected; the model predicts a matching 
probability of 0.71. Hence, the α-MaxMin model with prior set Cδ describes the typical 
pattern of ambiguity attitudes in the population well, including a-insensitivity.
We use the model estimates in Column (1) to test the alternative multiple prior models in 
hypotheses (11a–h) in subsequent steps. First, the data do not support subjective expected 
utility with reference probability measure π (11a): a joint test rejects the restrictions c=0 and 
δ=0. Second, the use of a pessimistic prior probability set [0,1] for the α-MaxMin model is 
not supported: hypotheses (11c–e) impose the restriction δ=1, which is rejected.25 Third, the 
symmetric prior probability set Csym for the α-MaxMin model is also inconsistent with the 
data: the restriction δ=0 in (11b) is rejected. Among the models based on the prior set Cδ, the 
pessimistic MaxMin-Cδ model (11f) and the optimistic MaxMax-Cδ (11g) are also both 
rejected, as they imply α=1 and α=0. Only the α-MaxMin model with prior set Cδ (0<δ<1) 
and 0<α<1) is consistent with the pattern of ambiguity attitudes in the U.S. population.
In sum, we find support for ambiguity preferences where not all the weight is put on the 
worst case (α=1) nor on the best case (α=0), and the prior probability set reflecting 
ambiguity perceptions is asymmetric for all π≠0.5.
4.3 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we next exclude respondents who gave incorrect answers to the two 
check questions: Column (2) limits the sample to respondents who answered both check 
questions correctly. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates change hardly at all, and our 
conclusions remain the same. For example, ambiguity aversion and confidence in the 
reference probability are both slightly lower among respondents who answered both check 
questions correctly (α=0.55, δ=0.45), but the difference is small compared to the full sample 
results.
23Pooled OLS estimates are consistent in the presence of random effects, but the standard errors may be inefficient. As we use 
clustered (robust) standard errors, the results of pooled OLS are similar to a random effects model.
24Our estimate of α is similar to values of α=0.515 reported in Ahn et al. (2014) for a small sample of students and α=0.556 in 
Potamites and Zhang (2012) for Chinese investors. Baillon et al. (2015) estimate α=0.61 and δ=0.51 in a sample of 64 students, with 
the source of ambiguity being the returns of an unknown stock.
25We test the single restriction δ=1, implied by all three models with [0,1] as the prior set. Joint tests of δ=1, α=1 for MaxMin-[0,1], 
or δ=1, α=0 for MaxMax-[0,1] give the same result.
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Statistical tests (available on request) confirm that a random effects model fits our data 
better than pooled OLS or fixed effects models. The row labeled “Error correlation (ρ)” in 
Table 2 shows the estimated within-individual correlation of the overall error term (εik+ui, 
including the random effect ui): ρ=0.30. The significance of ρ indicates unobserved 
heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion at the individual level; the variance of the errors 
drops by 30% after accounting for this unobserved heterogeneity.
In additional results (available on request), we estimate a model with a random effect added 
to the slope coefficient (s+vi), to capture unobserved heterogeneity in ambiguity perceptions 
(δ). The main coefficient estimates are unchanged (α=0.56, δ=0.40), as random effects only 
alter the covariance matrix of the errors. But, the variance of the errors  drops 
by another 23% after taking into account unobserved heterogeneity in perceived ambiguity. 
Further, posterior estimates of α and δ show a positive correlation between ambiguity 
aversion and perceived ambiguity, ranging from 0.2 to 0.4. Hence, those who perceive more 
ambiguity also tend to be more ambiguity averse.
4.4 Ambiguity attitudes for losses
Next we include the matching probability for the ambiguity question involving losses; our 
aim is to test whether ambiguity aversion differs for gains and losses. Recall that the 
matching probability for the ambiguity gains questions is mik=(1−α)δ+(1−δ)πk, for k=1, 2, 3. 
By contrast, the matching probability for the loss question is: , for k=4 
(see Online Appendix B). We introduce a separate ambiguity aversion parameter for losses, 
αL, distinct from α, the ambiguity aversion parameter for gains.26 The adapted regression 
model specification below allows us to test whether α=αL:
(12)
where Lk is a dummy variable for the loss question (Lk=0 for k=1, 2, 3, and Lk=1 for k=4), 
and dL is the corresponding regression coefficient. The parameters of the α-MaxMin model 
are identified as follows: δ=1−s and α=1−c/δ, and αL=(c+dL)/δ.
Table 3 displays estimation results for Equation (12). The row labeled “Test α=αL ” in Table 
3 shows that the data reject the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion for losses and gains are 
equal. Instead, we find ambiguity aversion for gains (α=0.56) and ambiguity seeking for 
losses (αL=0.46).27 We note that the restriction dL=0 corresponds to the special case of 
αL=(1-α), or reflection of ambiguity aversion for gains (α>½) into ambiguity seeking for 
losses (αL<½). In both columns in Table 3, we cannot reject dL=0 at the five percent 
significance level.
26The equations for mik and  have different constant terms, (1–α)δ and αLδ, so the model in Equation (11) is no longer applicable 
(it would imply the restriction 1–α=αL). Introducing a dummy variable for the loss question permits us to separately estimate and 
identify α and αL.
27A drawback of the model in Equation (12) is that the random effect ui has opposite effects on ambiguity aversion for gains and 
losses, an assumption inconsistent with the positive correlation between AA50 and AA−50. As a result the estimated correlation of the 
random effect (ρ) is relatively low in Table 3. We have also estimated a model with two separate random effects for the constant c and 
loss dummy dL, but we find no difference in the main results concerning α, αL and δ. Results are available on request.
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Reflection implies that the ambiguity attitude for losses is the opposite of that toward gains. 
Reflection is often found for decisions under risk, and it is part of prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1992): a common finding is of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking 
attitudes for losses. To the best of our knowledge, the results in Table 3 are the first 
confirmation of reflection as the typical pattern for decision-making under ambiguity in the 
general population. In line with our results, Kothiyal et al. (2014) find evidence of reflection 
in an experiment with students.
The results in Table 3 are subject to two caveats. First, as explained above, the ambiguity 
question for losses was implemented without real incentives to avoid house money effects. 
Second, in Equation (12) we assume that the perceived level of ambiguity δ is equal for 
gains and losses.28 This is equivalent to assuming that a-insensitivity is equal for gains and 
losses, which is supported by experimental evidence in Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015).
4.5 Ambiguity aversion and observed individual characteristics
Little is known about how ambiguity preferences vary with individual characteristics such as 
gender, age and income. Even less is known regarding individual characteristics and 
perceptions about ambiguity levels: in this section we are the first to investigate this relation.
29 Let xih denote the value of individual control variable h=1, 2,…,H, for person i=1,2,…,I. 
We estimate the following model:
(13)
where c0 is a constant and ch is a coefficient for the effect of variable h=1, 2,…,H on the 
constant part of the model. The set of coefficients sh allow the model’s slope coefficient to 
depend on the individual attributes, while s0 is the constant part of the slope. The parameters 
of the α-MaxMin model are identified as: , and 
.
The individual characteristics available from the ALP include indicators for male; White; 
Hispanic; married; education (highest degree: high school or college); employment; (ln) 
family income; (ln) number of children; a financial literacy index; an indicator of trust in 
others30; risk aversion; and question order. Online Appendix C provides variable definitions 
and descriptive statistics. The risk aversion metric is the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
of a power utility function estimated using questions similar to those in Tanaka et al. (2010).
31 We randomized the order of the ambiguity and risk questions in the ALP survey, with 
half of the respondents getting the risk questions first, and the other half the ambiguity 
28If we could measure more matching probabilities for ambiguous events involving loss outcomes with other likelihoods (e.g., similar 
to the 10 % and 90 % gains questions), we could also estimate δ separately in the loss domain. We leave to future research additional 
refinements of ambiguity surveys and tests for reference dependence.
29Borghans et al. (2009) find that men are more ambiguity averse than women in a sample of 347 high school students. In a study of 
the Dutch population, Dimmock et al. (2015b) estimate the relation between ambiguity attitudes and control variables; there, however, 
few effects are statistically significant (sample size: N=666). Using our ALP Module, Dimmock et al. (2015a) show in a web appendix 
that the non-parametric ambiguity aversion measure AA50 is higher for men than for women, and positively related to risk aversion.
30This is measured on a reversed scale from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating lower trust.
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questions first. For this reason, we include an indicator equal to one if the subject answered 
the risk questions first, and zero otherwise.
Table 4 reports the effects of the individual characteristics on ambiguity aversion α and the 
perceived level of ambiguity δ, with standard errors derived using the delta method. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 display marginal effects for ambiguity aversion α.32 
Columns (3) and (4) show the effect of the variables on perceived ambiguity δ.
Turning first to ambiguity aversion (α), we find that men are more ambiguity averse than 
women, consistent with the experimental results in Borghans et al. (2009). Ambiguity 
aversion is positively related to risk aversion, but the correlation is low and ambiguity 
aversion is not subsumed by it. Older people tend to be less ambiguity averse, which may 
capture the effect of life experiences, or a cohort effect. College-educated respondents have 
higher ambiguity aversion than the less educated. This latter finding is inconsistent with a 
potential alternative explanation for ambiguity aversion: that it is driven by low cognitive 
ability. Rather, the positive relation with college education suggests that ambiguity aversion 
measures preferences rather than cognitive errors.
We also find that ambiguity aversion is higher when the risk aversion questions are 
presented to respondents prior to the ambiguity questions. The comparative ignorance 
hypothesis of Fox and Tversky (1995), which states that ambiguity aversion is magnified by 
a comparison to less ambiguous events, predicts such an order effect. In our survey, the 
comparison is relative to the preceding risk questions involving only known probabilities 
and no ambiguity. For this reason we randomized the survey order of the risk and ambiguity 
questions.
Turning to perceived ambiguity (δ), we find that males, whites, and people with more 
children tend to perceive higher levels of ambiguity. Further, college-educated respondents 
perceive more ambiguity than high school educated respondents. Receiving the risk aversion 
questions first also is associated with higher perceptions of ambiguity. Interestingly, age and 
risk aversion do not influence perceptions about ambiguity levels, but only ambiguity 
aversion. Vice versa, having (more) children is associated with perceiving more ambiguity, 
but not with higher ambiguity aversion.
We also investigated how individual attributes are related to ambiguity aversion for losses, 
and in results not detailed here, we found that the dependent variable is positively related to 
risk aversion but not significantly associated with the other variables. Thus risk aversion is 
positively related to both ambiguity aversion for gains and ambiguity aversion for losses, but 
not related to the perceived level of ambiguity. A potential explanation is that preferences 
towards risk and ambiguity are related (although weakly) as both are preferences, while 
perceptions about the level of ambiguity are formed independently from risk preferences.
31As in Tanaka et al. (2010), utility is defined over the payoffs of the gambles (not integrated with total wealth), and the power 
coefficient is limited to the range from 0 to 1.5. Risk aversion, defined as ‘1 – power function coefficient’, varies from −0.5 (risk 
seeking) to +1 (strongest level of risk aversion), and a value of zero implies risk neutrality.
32The derivative of αi with of respect to xih is: , which we evaluate at the mean values of 
xih and δi.
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5 Conclusion
This paper develops a method for estimating and testing multiple prior models of ambiguity. 
Using a nationally representative sample of almost 3000 U.S. respondents, we use matching 
probabilities to estimate a measure of ambiguity preferences, α, as well as perceptions about 
the level of ambiguity, δ. Using our simple and tractable method, we estimate α to be equal 
to 0.56 in the gain domain, consistent with mild ambiguity aversion (α>½). We estimate δ to 
be 0.40, meaning that the typical respondent has a degree of confidence of 60% in the 
reference probability.
In the loss domain, our estimate of the ambiguity aversion parameter, αL, is equal to 0.46, 
implying ambiguity-seeking behavior (αL<1/2). Not only are ambiguity attitudes for gains 
and losses significantly different, they are of opposite sign on average, with ambiguity 
aversion for gains being reflected into ambiguity seeking for losses. This implies that the 
ambiguity models applied in economics need to be extended beyond the common 
assumption of universal ambiguity aversion. One such alternative is the α-MaxMin model 
with separate ambiguity aversion parameters for gains and for losses.
Furthermore, our estimates of the α-MaxMin model confirm that most Americans are 
ambiguity averse for uncertain events of moderate to high likelihood, but ambiguity seeking 
for unlikely events. For example, when faced with a chance to win if one of 10 colors is 
selected, 60% of the people are ambiguity seeking. Our α-MaxMin model can explain these 
choices because the prior probability set is asymmetric for low and high likelihood events. 
For example, when winning for one out of 10 colors, the set of prior probabilities in the 
calibrated model ranges from 6 to 46%.
For future work, our evidence of non-universal ambiguity aversion, especially ambiguity 
seeking choices for low likelihood events and losses, implies that understanding the 
economic implications of such preferences is important. The model developed in this paper 
offers a good starting point, as it is analytically simple, yet it can describe actual choices 
under uncertainty observed in the field.
Supplementary Material
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Fig. 1. 
First ambiguity question: winning for one of two ball colors. Notes: This figure shows the 
first round in the ambiguity question sequence with two ball colors. The respondent can win 
a prize of $15 if a purple ball is drawn from the box of his preference. Box K contains 50 
purple and 50 orange balls, offering 50% initial known probability of winning. Box U also 
contains purple and orange balls, but with the proportions unknown. If the respondent 
selects “Box K” or “Box U”, a second question round follows, similar to the one shown 
above. If the response is “Box K”, in the second round the probability of winning for Box K 
is decreased (fewer purple balls). Vice versa, when the respondent selects “Box U”, in the 
second round Box K offers a higher probability of winning (more purple balls). Selecting the 
“Indifferent” button takes the respondent to the next ambiguity sequence, shown in Fig. 2
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Fig. 2. 
Second ambiguity question: winning for one of ten ball colors. Notes: This figure shows the 
first round in the second ambiguity question sequence, with 10 ball colors. Here the 
respondent wins if a purple ball, 1 out of 10 colors, is drawn from the box of his preference. 
Box K contains 10 balls of each color and offers a 10% probability of winning. Box U also 
contains balls with 10 different colors, but with the proportions unknown. If the respondent 
selects “Box K” or “Box U”, a second question round follows, similar to the one shown 
above. If the response is “Box K”, in the second round the probability of winning for Box K 
is decreased (fewer purple balls). Vice versa, when the respondent selects “Box U”, in the 
second round Box K offers a higher probability of winning (more purple balls). Selecting the 
“Indifferent” button takes the respondent to the next ambiguity sequence: wining for nine 
out of ten ball colors
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Table 2
Alpha-MaxMin model estimates
(1) (2)
Constant c 0.177*** 0.200***
[42.56] [32.03]
Slope s 0.596*** 0.555***
[88.97] [55.46]
Alpha-Min α 0.562*** 0.549***
[77.13] [59.53]
Alpha-Max (1-α) 0.438*** 0.451***
[60.19] [48.90]
Delta δ 0.404*** 0.445***
[60.40] [44.39]
Restriction on checks No 2 correct
I individuals 2991 1232
R2 0.431 0.449
Error st. dev. (σε) 0.187 0.171
Random effect st. dev.(σu) 0.123 0.106
Error correlation (ρ) 0.302 0.280
Notes: The table shows estimation results for the α-MaxMin model, derived from matching probabilities mik for the three ambiguity gain questions 
(k=1, 2, 3). We estimate Equation (10) using a random effects model, which gives estimates of the slope coefficient s and constant c. Estimates of 
ambiguity aversion parameter α and perceived ambiguity δ are then derived from c and s, with standard errors based on the delta method. Column 
(1): full sample results. The full sample consists of respondents who answered all ambiguity questions and spent at least two minutes of time. 
Column (2): same model, but further limited to 1232 respondents who answered both check questions correctly. Standard errors are shown in 
brackets (robust, clustered by individual).
Statistical significance:
*
p<0.1,
**
p<0.05,
***
p<0.01
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Table 3
Testing reference dependence: alpha for gains and losses
(1) (2)
Constant c 0.177*** 0.200***
[43.51] [32.02]
Slope s 0.596*** 0.555***
[88.97] [55.46]
Loss dummy dL 0.010* −0.008
[1.87] [1.13]
Delta δ 0.404*** 0.445***
[60.40] [44.39]
Gains
Alpha-Min α 0.562*** 0.549***
[77.13] [59.53]
Alpha-Max (1-α) 0.438*** 0.451***
[60.19] [48.89]
Losses
Alpha-Min αL 0.463*** 0.433***
[52.73] [39.27]
Alpha-Max (1-αL) 0.537*** 0.567***
[61.21] [51.49]
Restriction on checks No 2 correct
I individuals 2991 1232
R2 0.377 0.397
Test α=αL 108.2*** 91.4***
Error st. dev. (σε) 0.210 0.188
Random effect st. dev. (σu) 0.052 0.041
Error correlation (ρ) 0.058 0.056
Notes: The table shows estimation results for the α-MaxMin model, derived from matching probabilities mik for all four ambiguity questions (k=1, 
2, 3, 4), including the question involving losses as outcomes. We estimate Equation (12), which gives estimates of the slope coefficient s, constant 
c and the coefficient for the loss question dummy dL. Using these estimates, we then derive values for δ (perceived ambiguity), α (ambiguity 
aversion for gains), and αL (ambiguity aversion for losses), with standard errors based on the delta-method. The row “Test α=αL” displays a chi-
square statistic for the null hypothesis α=αL ambiguity aversion for gains and losses are equal. Column (1): full sample estimates. Column (2): 
same model, but limited to 1232 respondents who answered both check questions correctly. Standard errors are shown in brackets (robust, clustered 
by individual).
Statistical significance:
*
p<0.1,
**
p<0.05,
***
p<0.01
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Table 4
Ambiguity aversion and beliefs explained by individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alpha-Min α Perceived ambiguity δ
Age −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.001 −0.001
Male 0.072*** 0.083*** 0.065*** 0.063***
White −0.057*** −0.028 0.068*** 0.060**
Hispanic 0.018 0.053* −0.018 0.004
Married 0.017 −0.014 −0.004 −0.043*
Num. of kids (ln) −0.015 −0.013 0.031** 0.050***
High school −0.003 0.042 −0.038 0.015
College 0.083* 0.145** −0.005 0.063
  College–High school 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.033** 0.047**
Employed −0.022 −0.030 0.002 0.009
Income (ln) 0.004 0.016 0.003 0.007
Risk questions first 0.125*** 0.072*** 0.046*** 0.048**
Financial literacy −0.003 0.012 0.016* 0.027*
Risk aversion 0.147*** 0.090*** 0.009 −0.009
Trust 0.007 −0.003 −0.007 −0.008
Restriction on checks No 2 correct No 2 correct
I individuals 2934 1215
R2 0.458 0.483
Error st. dev. (σε) 0.185 0.169
Random effect st. dev. (σu) 0.045 0.116
Error correlation (ρ) 0.280 0.250
Notes: The table shows estimation results for the α-MaxMin model, including a set of individual-level explanatory variables for both ambiguity 
preferences and beliefs. The dependent variable is the matching probability mik for all three ambiguity gains questions (k=1, 2, 3). We estimate 
Equation (13), including the 14 explanatory variables shown in the table (Age, Male,…, Trust). See Online Appendix C for definitions of the 
explanatory variables. Columns (1) and (2) show marginal effects of the explanatory variables on ambiguity aversion (α), and model statistics such 
as R2. Columns (3) and (4) display the effects of the explanatory variables on perceived ambiguity (δ). Estimates of the constant (c) and slope 
coefficient (s) are not shown to save space. The model includes two dummies for the highest education level achieved: completing high school, or 
completing college. The base category for education consists of respondents not completing high school. The row “College–High school” tests for 
differences in the groups with college education and high school education. Columns (1) and (3): full sample results. Columns (2) and (4): same 
model, but limited to respondents who answered both check questions correctly.
Statistical significance:
*
p<0.1,
**
p<0.05,
***
p<0.01
J Risk Uncertain. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 December 01.
